Centering Community in Nonpartisan Electoral Campaigns

Case Study of Parent Voices Oakland and the Alameda County Measure A Campaign

May 2019

Dr. Marti Frank
Katie Fox
Briana Rusin
Johanna Morariu

Photo credit: SEIU Local 521
# Table of Contents

Executive Summary .................................................................................................................. 2  
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 7 
2. Measure A Overview ........................................................................................................... 8 
3. Achievements of the Measure A Campaign ....................................................................... 11 
4. Parent Voices Oakland’s Contributions to Measure A ....................................................... 14 
5. Community Change’s Contributions ............................................................................... 20 
6. Success Factors .................................................................................................................. 24 
7. Why Didn’t Measure A Pass? ............................................................................................ 29 
8. Challenges for Community Organizations Engaging in Electoral Work ....................... 34 
9. What’s Next for Measure A ............................................................................................... 41 
10. Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... 42
Executive Summary

This case study tells the story of the YES on Measure A campaign, a June 2018 ballot initiative to fund early childhood education in Alameda County, California. While the measure failed to pass, the campaign made important gains for early childhood education in Alameda County. The case highlights the experience of one community organization, Parent Voices Oakland (PVO), which exemplifies the challenges, tensions, and benefits for community organizations engaging deeply or for the first time in nonpartisan electoral work.

What was the YES on Measure A campaign?

Measure A was a June 2018 ballot measure in Alameda County, California that proposed a 0.5 percent retail sales tax to fund a wide range of early childhood services for parents, children, and childcare providers. The tax was expected to raise $140 million annually.

Measure A’s path to the ballot was a long one that began in 2015 when community and labor advocates started talking to the Alameda County Board of Supervisors about the need for increased funding for early childhood education (ECE). Over the next few years, a large coalition of community and labor organizations and activists, childcare experts, funders, and county officials worked together to develop a policy for ECE that would not only improve the accessibility and quality of ECE but also increase compensation and benefits for childcare providers. In March 2018, the Board of Supervisors unanimously voted to recommend the measure to the June ballot, marking the official start of the Measure A campaign. Over the next 88 days, community and labor organizations worked with political consulting firm, Clifford Moss, to educate, identify, and turnout voters to support the measure. Measure A achieved 66.2 percent of the popular vote but failed to pass, because a two-thirds supermajority (66.7 percent) is required in California for all measures that would increase taxes.

A brief overview of the Measure A campaign, including details about timeline, the policy, and the major campaign partners, is included in “Section 2. Measure A Overview.”

What did the Measure A campaign achieve?

Although the Measure A campaign did not yield the expected electoral outcome, the policy development process and campaign resulted in several important accomplishments that will position the campaign partners for greater impact in future campaigns:

- Raised the profile of ECE issues in Alameda County and earned broad support for ECE among the public, county officials, and community leaders.
- Developed a strong policy for ECE that is being looked to as a model for ECE policy in other cities.
• Pioneered an innovative funding model to support the campaign at the East Bay Community Foundation that other funders are now looking to replicate.

• Deepened trust, relationships, and alignment in the diverse cohort of community and labor organizations involved in the campaign.

“Section 3, Achievements of the Measure A Campaign” provides further analysis for each of these findings.

**What factors facilitated these accomplishments?**

The successes of the campaign were supported by a number of contextual factors (i.e., factors rooted in place and immutable in the short-term) and controllable factors (i.e., those that may be subject to influence by Community Change or its partners).

**Contextual factors included:**

• Prior discrete local events that created interest and momentum for Measure A, including the minimum wage increase in Oakland, the San Francisco’s Children and Youth Fund, and declining revenues for the county’s existing ECE program.

• Rising economic inequality and costs-of-living in the Bay Area that increased the urgency and need for subsidized childcare.

• Alameda County’s progressive electorate that was predisposed to support the measure.

• Existing technical expertise and history of work on ECE issues in Alameda County that facilitated the creation of strong policy language.

**Controllable factors included:**

• Diverse campaign partners that came together from different communities and fields to work on the measure. This diversity was seen as a critical ingredient in the campaign’s successes, in particular its ability to gain support from nearly two out of three county voters.

• Early advocacy and support from Supervisors Chan and Miley were critical in getting the measure on the June 2018 ballot.

• Strong support of the SEIU labor union brought considerable resources, connections, and political power to the policy development process and campaign.

• Engaging directly affected people in the policy creation and campaign grounded the campaign in the real impacts the measure would have on families and children.

• The leadership, expertise, and persistence of Clarissa Doutherd, Executive Director of Parent Voices Oakland who, through the policy development and campaign, was a strong, persistent advocate for an ECE policy that would authentically support the most directly impacted children and families.
• Proactive funding community that had a long commitment to supporting childcare in the county. These philanthropists recruited and organized other funders and set up an innovative pooled funding model to resource the campaign.

*To read about each of these factors in more detail, please see “Section 6. Success Factors.”*

**What role did Parent Voices Oakland play in the campaign?**

Parent Voices Oakland (PVO) is one of 15 local chapters of the statewide organization Parent Voices which helps parents advocate for themselves and their children through leadership training, advocacy, and community organizing. PVO, founded in 1996 as the second chapter of Parent Voices, is a woman-of-color-led organization in Oakland that began advocating for additional funding for ECE before the County Board of Supervisors in 2015. PVO is described as one of the “key drivers,” “instigator,” and “heart and soul” of the Measure A effort.

From early in the policy development process, PVO and its Executive Director, Clarissa Doutherd, used its leadership and influence to center and lift up the voices and needs of directly affected parents and children. PVO is credited with grounding the policy and campaign in the real impacts it would have on low-income families and children. Throughout the process, PVO empowered its parent members to be advocates, spokespeople, and active participants in the campaign and used their connections to bring other local community organizations into the campaign, further enhancing the measure’s credibility and reach.

Prior to the campaign, PVO had never before engaged in electoral organizing. They described their engagement in the campaign as a “catalyzing moment” for the organization that led to substantial capacity growth at PVO. Engagement in the campaign increased PVO’s reputation and standing, strengthened their relationships in Alameda County, increased their political savvy and ability to conduct voter engagement, built their internal organization infrastructure, and developed staff’s leadership abilities.

*For more detail about PVO’s contributions and capacity growth, see “Section 4. Parent Voices Oakland’s Contributions to Measure A.”*

**What role did Community Change play in the campaign?**

Community Change is a national organization that partners with and supports community organizations throughout the country to “build the power and capacity of low-income people, especially low-income people of color, to change their communities and public policies for the better.” As a longtime partner to PVO, Community Change supported PVO throughout the policy development process and the campaign and contributed to the Measure A campaign in five distinct ways:

• Funding PVO and the Measure A campaign.

• Providing hands-on, on-the-ground support to PVO.
● Facilitating communication and relationship building between PVO and other campaign partners.

● Providing strategy, policy, and some light communications support to PVO.

● Connecting PVO to a variety of other external resources including a national cohort of childcare organizations convened by Community Change, donors, and influential national and local groups.

Further description of Community Change’s role is provided in “Section 5. Community Change’s Contributions.”

What explanations are there for why Measure A didn’t pass?

Because the campaign lost by such a small margin, interviewees felt almost any small difference could have changed the outcome. Interviewees provided numerous possible explanations for the Measure A loss. Some of the major explanations included:

● Strategic choices about voter targeting.

● Lack of attention to race in the policy making process and campaign even though Measure A sought to address problems disproportionately affecting people of color.

● Challenges in messaging a policy with Measure A’s complexity and breadth.

● Technical and language barriers which slowed the pace of voter identification.

For more information about these findings and a host of other hypotheses for why Measure A did not pass, see “Section 7. Why didn’t Measure A Pass?”

What can we learn from this case study about the challenges community organizations like PVO face when engaging in electoral work? What support do community organizations need?

Prior to the Measure A campaign, few of PVO’s staff or volunteers had worked on an electoral campaign. Their experience lifts up issues any community organization may encounter when engaging in deep electoral work, the capacities they need to thrive, and the support organizations like Community Change can provide to position them for success.

The Measure A campaign revealed a common recurring dynamic between traditional political campaigns and community organizations doing electoral work. Traditional political campaigns and consultants are often subject to unrelenting timelines, compelling them to place high value on quantitative outputs and to direct their limited resources to targeting likely or high propensity voters. This traditional approach to voter engagement tends to leave behind more inconsistent or newer voters who are often young, immigrants, people of color, and/or low income. In contrast, community organizations like PVO seek to
not only turn out voters but to also engage historically underrepresented voters, raise awareness of issues, build their base, and develop local volunteers and leaders for the long-term.

Throughout the campaign PVO was challenged to balance the campaign’s need for quantitative output with their desire to authentically engage affected communities. They also struggled to gain legitimacy, respect, and decision-making power in a more traditional campaign structure. Although PVO and other community organizations played a lead role during the policy development process, when the campaign began, the role of community organizations shifted to a consultative role on the periphery of the campaign’s strategic decision-making team. While the consultants described this shift as typical of the transition between pre-electoral to electoral work, community organizations had the experience of feeling excluded and devalued.

In addition to these challenges with the campaign consultants, PVO also had to overcome a number of technical and internal obstacles to engaging in electoral work:

- Learning about electoral organizing while on the job.
- Training and providing real-time support to volunteers on electoral processes, computer technology, and translation services.
- Expending significant staff and financial resources.
- Navigating new and burdensome legal and reporting requirements.

To read in more depth about these challenges and our recommendations for support organizations like Community Change can provide in the future, see “Section 8. Challenges for Community Organizations Engaging in Electoral Work.”

What’s next for early childhood education in Alameda County?

The expansive early childhood policy that came to be known as Measure A has likely not seen its last campaign. Nearly all interviewees expect the policy to be back on the ballot in November 2020. Over the next year and a half, advocates plan to conduct additional polling to test messages and refine their campaign strategy, make minor adjustments to the policy to address issues raised in the 2018 campaign, and continue tracking demographic shifts in Alameda County and their potential impacts on support for the policy.

When looking to 2020 and a potential re-running of Measure A, PVO leaders expressed a preference for a different type of campaign, one in which community organizations are centered and decision-making is collaborative. One interviewee summed up the sentiment, “How we win is important. We have to let go of the idea that we can’t win by centering community.”
1. Introduction

The story of Alameda County’s Measure A, a 2018 ballot measure to fund early childhood education, is one of collaboration and community engagement. The experience of one community organization, Parent Voices Oakland (PVO), exemplifies the challenges, tensions, and benefits for community organizations engaging deeply or for the first time in nonpartisan electoral work.

While Measure A failed to pass by the thinnest of margins, falling less than one-half a percent (1,499 votes) short of the two-thirds majority needed, the policy development process and campaign led to important successes. Measure A earned broad support for, and increased awareness of, the need for more early childhood education funding in Alameda County. The policy proposal was sweeping and nuanced, dealing with accessibility of early childhood education as well as supply and workforce issues. In managing the financial support behind the campaign, a key East Bay philanthropy developed an innovative funding model, now of interest to others across the country. The campaign catalyzed substantial growth across multiple capacities at PVO, a community organization working in partnership with Community Change, a national organization building the power and capacity of low-income people to change their communities and public policies for the better. And, while not without areas of tension and disagreement, the campaign deepened relationships between community organizations, labor unions, and Alameda County government that seem likely to endure.

This case study was developed by Innovation Network, a nonprofit research and evaluation consulting firm, in partnership with Community Change. The case draws on several sources of information:

- Four site visits to Alameda County during the campaign to conduct interviews and observe phonebanks, canvasses, rallies, and meetings (March to June 2018).
- Weekly phone check-ins with Community Change organizer Cesar Hernandez, also during the campaign (March to June 2018).
- Post-campaign telephone interviews with 16 key participants in the campaign (October 2018 to February 2019).
- Review of Measure A policy and campaign documents.

This case study describes the Measure A campaign, its challenges, and the contextual and controllable success factors that underlie it. Throughout the study, we highlight the role and contributions of PVO and underscore the unique challenges and benefits of nonpartisan electoral work for community organizations.
2. Measure A Overview

Measure A was a June 2018 ballot measure in Alameda County, California that proposed a 0.5 percent retail sales tax to fund a wide range of early childhood services for parents, children, and childcare providers. The tax was expected to raise $140 million annually. Measure A achieved 66.2 percent of the popular vote but failed to pass, because a two-thirds supermajority (66.7 percent) is required in California for all measures that would increase taxes.

Measure A’s path to the ballot

Measure A’s path to the ballot was long and engaged a large coalition of community and labor organizations, volunteers, elected leaders and their staff, county childcare experts, and local and national grant-makers.

Community and labor advocates in Alameda County began bringing the need for increased funding for early childhood education (ECE) to the county Board of Supervisors in 2015. Members and advocates from labor union Service Employees International Union (SEIU) had begun meeting privately with county supervisors to address the challenges childcare providers faced in the wake of local laws raising the minimum wage. SEIU’s childcare provider members felt squeezed by rising labor costs because they did not feel they could pass these costs on to their parent clients, whose childcare subsidies remained the same and who could not afford to pay more. At about the same time, community organization Parent Voices Oakland (PVO) made their demands public, taking their request for increased ECE funding to the Board of Supervisors at the supervisors’ June budget meetings in 2015 and 2016.

Supervisor Wilma Chan, a longtime advocate for early childhood issues, was in agreement with labor and community advocates about the need to address the many challenges with the county’s early childhood care, and in late 2016 began working with them to increase ECE funding in the county. The idea of proposing a new retail sales tax, to be approved by voters through a ballot measure, was arrived at by early 2017 and the Board of Supervisors tasked the General Services Agency’s Early Care and Education Program with drafting a plan and conducting widespread public outreach.

In the latter half of 2017, the county’s ECE program staff led the drafting of the policy and coordinated participation from county staff with expertise in early childhood, staff of each of the supervisors, representatives from SEIU, several community organizations advocating for childcare issues or people of color, representatives from Bay Area foundations, childcare providers, and the public.

In March 2018, the Board of Supervisors voted to recommend the measure to the June ballot, beginning the official campaign for Measure A. Political consulting firm Clifford Moss, known for their previous successes winning two-third ballot campaigns, ran the campaign out of a headquarters office in downtown Oakland. Community and labor organizations were deeply engaged in the campaign effort, as well as county staff, who volunteered on personal time. Key campaign activities included phonebanking
and door-kicking to identify “YES on Measure A” voters and soliciting endorsements and supportive earned media.

Images from the Measure A Kick-off Rally on March 23, 2018

L to R: Supervisor Wilma Chan addressing attendees, Measure A campaign signs on a bulletin board; “Share your Story” posters.

Images from the Measure A Campaign
L to R: Headquarters phonebank in downtown Oakland; Volunteers attending a joint Measure A - Democratic Party canvass in Pleasanton

Measure A: The policy
Interviewees described Measure A as embodying two features unusual in public policy: it had a breadth of elements that attempted to address nearly all aspects of the complex childcare system, and it was developed using a deeply collaborative process.

Measure A proposed to use the new tax revenue to fund three core goals: increase the number of scholarships for ECE, increase childcare provider compensation and benefits, and improve the quality of ECE services. The benefits of the measure were to include both childcare provided in centers and in homes. The policy also provided for navigation services for families, additional support for high-need communities, technical assistance to providers to support outreach and enrollment, stipends for childcare providers for time spent undertaking professional development, and grants for childcare materials and equipment.
Case Study of the Measure A Campaign

**Non-governmental organizations involved in the development of Measure A and the Measure A campaign**

**Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment (ACCE).** A statewide community action organization that organizes at the neighborhood level on issues including affordable housing, voter engagement, and racial justice. ACCE conducted voter outreach during the campaign.

**Clifford Moss.** A political consultancy specializing in campaigns for transportation, education, city and county tax measures, and candidates. A coalition of ECE proponents hired Clifford Moss for pre-electoral strategy work, and subsequently, hired the firm to run the YES on Measure A campaign.

**East Bay Community Foundation (EBCF).** An Oakland-based funder of programs and campaigns in the areas of early childhood, arts, environment, economic development, and civic engagement. EBCF contributed approximately half of the total Measure A campaign budget using a novel funding model.

**Parent Voices Oakland (PVO).** The Oakland chapter of a state-wide, grassroots, member-led community organization advocating for low-income and homeless parents, predominantly women of color. PVO was deeply engaged in the policy development and in identifying and training directly affected parents to tell their stories. During the campaign, PVO ran two phone banks, provided volunteers for canvases, translated campaign materials into Spanish, and consulted with campaign organizers on strategy.

**Oakland Rising.** A multi-lingual, multi-racial community organization based in East and West Alameda County that provides leadership training, conducts voter outreach, and works on issues of housing, criminal justice reform, and labor standards. During the campaign, Oakland Rising conducted voter outreach.

**Service Employees International Union (SEIU).** Participants from this influential labor union came from the national organization and locals 1021 and 521. SEIU provided funding for early polling and development work on Measure A; its organizers were central in the development of Measure A policy and active in voter identification and strategy during the campaign.

**Childcare in Alameda County**

Advertisement for a Church-based childcare center in a lower-income, predominantly Spanish-speaking neighborhood in Hayward, an example of the type of childcare centers Measure A would have supported with training and subsidies

Policy development was led by the county, whose early childcare experts convened a 29-member Steering Committee and an Advisory Panel with an additional 54 members. Steering Committee members included representatives from community organizations, labor, county staff, foundation staff, and political consultants. The committee met weekly for eight months and reviewed multiple iterations of the policy. The county and stakeholders held nearly 100 meetings with community members and collected more than 500 feedback forms, the substance of which was incorporated into the policy.
3. Achievements of the Measure A Campaign

Although Measure A did not garner the necessary 66.7 percent of votes required for passage, the policy development process and campaign resulted in several important accomplishments, including garnering support from a majority of voters, developing a strong ECE policy, launching an innovative funding model, engaging a broad and diverse coalition, and building organizational capacity. While the campaign did not yield the expected electoral outcome, the campaign fostered and developed an ecosystem and infrastructure for political engagement around ECE issues in the county that will position the campaign partners for greater impact in future campaigns.

Earned broad public awareness of and support for the Measure and early childhood education issues in Alameda County

The Measure A campaign demonstrated broad public support for ECE. A majority of voters, 66.2 percent, voted in favor of the ballot initiative. To campaign partners and advocates this meant that “200,000 people [in the county] say they believe in a massive investment in early childhood education.” Interviewees with experience in local ballot measures underscored the difficulty of winning a two-thirds tax measure in Alameda County. “Polling showed that at least 25 percent of likely voters were hard ‘Nos’ so achieving 66.7 percent was a huge challenge.” “What we learned from an independent research firm after the fact [was] that it was a miracle that we got as far as we did... Napa got to 45 percent, Sacramento got to 65 percent, Marin County 63 percent, San Francisco 50. We were at 66.2 percent, the highest of them all.”

The Measure A campaign also raised the profile of early childhood issues in Alameda County. The campaign increased the public’s level of awareness about the importance and cost of ECE and the wages of childcare workers. “We definitely demonstrated very broad support for this issue...it really elevated childcare, early care, and education in Oakland and Alameda County.”

The campaign also increased support for ECE among county officials, advocates, and other community organizations and leaders. While only Supervisors Chan and Miley led the charge for the measure at its outset, by the time the Board voted on the ballot language in early 2018 it had unanimous support from all five Supervisors. Since the campaign, ECE advocates have seen an increase in the number of organizations and individuals supporting the work. “Some organizations that previously had not focused on early education have started seeing it as part of their intersectional analysis of what families in this county need to be economically sustainable.” Measure A, for instance, was the first time SEIU engaged in a local childcare campaign. Commented one advocate, “We’ve actually grown stronger through the campaign. We have more and more partners and committed individuals than we did when we started.”

Many of those involved in the campaign credited the work of the YES on Measure A campaign in securing this level of support. Some of the campaign’s major contributions included:

- Compelling TV, radio, and web ad campaign with strategic targeting of key demographics.
● Strong volunteer recruitment and mobilization.
● Strong GOTV turnout, particularly of North County voters.

**Developed a strong policy for early childhood education**

The Measure A policy itself was hailed as an excellent piece of public policy both for its breadth and nuance and has since been looked to as a model of ECE policy in other cities. The policy balanced the needs of childcare workers while also expanding access to ECE. It included a detailed expenditure plan and accountability measures and “incorporated all of the best practices of the field of childcare and pulled together...solutions for all the challenges...being faced in the childcare field.” County officials, community organizations, and labor unions spent months negotiating and co-creating the policy language and incorporating community input all throughout the process. “I’ve worked on a lot of different issues and I’ve just never seen the level of intentionality around community engagement.” County officials and advocates alike credit the collaborative and grassroots process as the key to such a “fantastic,” “holistic,” and well-supported policy.

**Pioneered an innovative funding model**

The East Bay Community Foundation (EBCF) pioneered an innovative pooled funding model to support the Measure A campaign that other institutional funders are now looking to replicate. Because private foundations are subject to more restrictions on their giving than public and community foundations, it can be difficult for private foundations to give funds to electoral campaigns. As a community foundation, EBCF has more flexibility to give to electoral organizing. The Foundation created a pooled fund that aggregated donations from private foundations and others. Through this process, the campaign raised approximately $1.2 million from a variety of donors, funding that was used to pay the campaign consultants and support the voter engagement work of the campaign partners.

**Engaged a broad cohort of community and labor organizations, laying the foundation for future collaborations and campaigns**

A broad-based coalition of individuals and organizations worked together on the Measure A campaign, including labor unions, community organizations, elected officials, faith organizations, and experts. Many of these groups had worked together for years leading up to the campaign, discussing and negotiating on ECE issues and eventually developing the policy language together. As a result, these organizations developed “trust and faith” in each other and shared a deep commitment to securing funding for ECE and passing the ballot initiative. “Until you have a shared common cause it can be hard sometimes to get to that level of depth and ability to work together.”

The deepening of the relationship between labor and childcare workers was notable in large part because of the absence of such a relationship the past. “Historically there hasn’t been a lot of trust or dynamism in that relationship. Locally and at national level, childcare providers have been reticent to be organized by labor and the field has been nervous about labor for a variety of reasons. But tensions have been working themselves out. People have started to be more collaborative.”
The strong relationships and alignment among the campaign partners provides a foundation for the stakeholders to work from in future campaigns for ECE. Campaign partners feel they have developed relationships that will outlast the campaign and can be leveraged in future efforts. Campaign partners are already working together with an eye towards perhaps making another attempt to pass the measure in 2020. “The people that started off, you know, two-plus years ago wanting to do this are still working together today even though we didn't win...we're going to find a way to get this thing done eventually, if it takes us a couple more years. We'll keep at it. We have some tremendous partners who are committed to working together for the long haul.”
4. Parent Voices Oakland’s Contributions to Measure A

Parent Voices Oakland (PVO) is one of 15 local chapters of the statewide organization Parent Voices, a program of the nonprofit California Child Care Resource & Referral Network. Parent Voices was created in 1996 to help parents advocate for themselves and their children through leadership training, advocacy, and community organizing. PVO, founded in 1996, was the second local Parent Voices chapter. As of 2019 PVO has four full-time staff: an Executive Director, Outreach Coordinator, Administrative Coordinator, and Policy and Research Associate.

PVO engages in ongoing work training parents and engaging in advocacy with local and state policymakers, and in this context began advocating for additional funding for early childhood care before the Alameda County Board of Supervisors in 2015. PVO was particularly vocal on behalf of homeless children and their persistence in advocacy earned them the attention of Supervisor Wilma Chan. Recalled one interviewee, PVO “always showed up at Board meetings, saying [childcare] is a problem.”

The collaboration between PVO and Supervisor Chan that resulted from PVO’s persistent, focused advocacy began even before Measure A came into focus when, in 2016, Supervisor Chan allocated $100,000 of her office’s budget for a pilot program managed by PVO to provide childcare vouchers to homeless children. By the time Supervisor Chan and her staff decided to champion a ballot measure to fund early childhood care in mid-2017, PVO had demonstrated its depth of understanding of the needs of affected parents and its value as a partner in addressing those needs.

By late 2016, PVO’s advocacy work had put childcare on the county’s agenda. Interviewees described PVO as “one of the key drivers,” “the instigator of this whole measure,” whose advocacy “prompted this whole conversation.” Said another, “Without Parent Voices, I don't really believe that this would have happened at all.”

Interviewees uniformly credited PVO with shaping the character of the campaign and bringing credibility and authenticity. “I believed [PVO] firmly to be the heart and soul and backbone of this whole effort. Parent Voices Oakland brought, in my estimation, all of the credibility and real community commitment to this issue,” said one interviewee.

**Centering the needs of parents during policy development**

Interviewees believe PVO speaks with authenticity on childcare issues and the needs of parents, a capacity rooted in the organization’s long-standing connection to affected parents through their training and advocacy work, history of advocating in the East Bay, close ties to other community organizations, and their own staff’s personal life stories. Two PVO staff central to the campaign are women of color, mothers, and one has both received, and experienced losing, childcare subsidies. These capacities are visible in every aspect of PVO’s work on, and contribution to, the Measure A campaign.
PVO was engaged in the development of the Measure A policy from its earliest days, with Executive Director Clarissa Doutherd serving on the Steering Committee. Doutherd brought her approach to advocacy, which she employed with the Board of Supervisors and other elected officials, to her work on the Steering Committee. All interviewees agreed, this made Measure A a stronger, more responsive piece of public policy. Observed an interviewee, “They were there every step of the way being true champions for making sure the exact policy was good for families.” From Doutherd’s perspective, this meant including the voices of parents in the policy-making process. “We approached this as the process being as important as the outcome.”

Said another interviewee, of potential policy decisions, “There were so many unintended consequences that Parent Voices Oakland brought up. That became a part of the narrative that would have been completely overlooked.” Interviewees highlighted PVO’s lifting up the substantial and unique needs of homeless families, previously unknown barriers in navigational services, and the impact of choices in language and phrasing on parents.

PVO’s strength in advocacy, explained one interviewee, is to come “into a situation and speak to a specific point of view that may not be represented in the conversation. [PVO] brought that advocacy for the parents and families into the policy development process.” PVO staff and parents were “willing to lift up challenging dynamics in the campaign,” both in the policy process and in the field, “things that people in the county couldn’t say, labor couldn’t say, [PVO] had the freedom to be honest and real about problems and challenges that needed to be worked through as a group.”

Engaging directly affected parents in the campaign

PVO’s day-to-day work is training, organizing, and listening to parents who struggle to afford childcare, and they were the only member of the campaign team with such a deep connection to the population that Measure A sought to help.

This made PVO the go-to organization for a number of campaign needs: training parents to tell their stories at events, identifying parents and children whose pictures and stories the campaign featured in its literature, and turning out families at public meetings and as campaign volunteers. Noted one county staff member, “when they turn out people for a Board of Supervisor’s meeting, they come very well prepared to really empower their parents to be advocates and help train them to know the issues and express their views tell their stories.” Because of PVO, the stories and lived experience of families permeated the campaign. Observed one interviewee, “I think [PVO] helped to ground the campaign in the real impacts on families, particularly low-income families—that these children and families would receive if the measure passed.”

PVO recruited parents not only as spokespeople or representatives of the affected population, but as volunteers and active participants in the campaign. Their phonebanks and canvasses were staffed almost exclusively by their parent volunteers, nearly all women of color, many of whom were not fluent in English.
PVO’s long-standing connection to affected parents guided their priorities as participants in the campaign—the issues they deemed important and for which they fought within the campaign itself. Throughout, PVO argued for the importance of addressing Alameda’s monolingual Spanish population. They lobbied the campaign consultants to translate outward-facing materials, like door hangers and scripts used by phonebank volunteers, and to provide call lists of Spanish-speaking households. When the Spanish translations were not provided, PVO hired a translator.

PVO’s ability to bolster the campaign in this way was the result of their long-term investment in, and approach to, training and organizing parents. “PVO is so multi-faceted in making sure that there is a wrap-around in training and what goes into training each volunteer is tremendous: emotional, psychological, educational, physical development.”

**Connecting the campaign to trusted community organizations**

In the early stages of the campaign, as policy development transitioned into electoral work, PVO leveraged their staff’s personal connections with leaders of other East Bay community organizations to engage those organizations, notably ACCE and Oakland Rising, as campaign partners. Both groups were active in the campaign, sending volunteers and tabling at the kick-off event in late March and conducting voter outreach.

That a number of trusted community organizations were behind Measure A gave the campaign credibility in the communities the Measure was intended to benefit. Said one community leader, “If we would not have been there, it would have been the traditional ‘Go talk to the elected officials, to the State Assembly people, to the Democratic Party. Go get some photo ops and push this down everyone's throat.’”

**Phonebanking and canvassing**

When the Measure A campaign began in March 2018, PVO took on electoral work, setting up and managing two phonebanks and multiple neighborhood canvasses. Running their own phonebanks and canvasses was valuable and important to PVO. Said one PVO staff member, “We learned a lot about what doesn’t work and what does work for our organization. We learned where we needed to strengthen our leadership development, why stipends don’t work for us, how critical functioning technology is. Most importantly, we didn’t know we could do it.”

Interviewees largely agree that PVO met its quantitative goals. According to the campaign consultants, PVO exceeded their phonebank “yes ID” goals. PVO organizers viewed themselves as having “contributed a lot of people power” to the campaign and filling most, if not all, of their phonebank shifts. One campaign staff member felt that “PVO did a phenomenal job. They always beat their goals. Other people with more technological experience didn’t. They were so passionate about getting this work done. They held the bar high on themselves. They would pivot to the paper lists when the tech went down. I saw stacks and stacks of paper lists being called.”
Images from the PVO Fruitvale phonebank
L to R: Volunteers at the phonebank; phonebank manager Rachel Harrelson’s files; Community Change organizer Cesar Hernandez, cleaning up after a phonebank shift (PVO’s leased space needed to be cleaned, the furniture torn down, and all equipment removed after each shift).

Valuing PVO’s contributions: A matter of perspective
When asked about PVO’s contributions to the campaign, interviewees (outside PVO) were nearly unanimous in pointing to aspects other than PVO’s phonebanking and canvassing. Why did interviewees focus on PVO’s qualitative contributions to the campaign and downplay their electoral work?

While there is no definitive answer to this question, there are possible explanations. The work of phonebanking and canvassing is, while critical to electoral success, also mundane, considered by many to be a commodity measured on quantitative results. In this context, PVO was one of several organizations doing the same work. Although to PVO the tasks were new, challenging, and consumed the majority of their time and resources, their undertaking did not distinguish PVO from other community and labor organizations who also made calls and knocked on doors. Another possible explanation is the siloed nature of the partners’ campaign work, at least compared to the great degree of interactivity during the pre-campaign period. With their attention focused inward on meeting their organization’s goals, interviewees may not have been attentive to one another’s day-to-day work on the campaign. This may have led interviewees to focus their appreciation of PVO on the contributions with which they were most familiar, those that dominated the pre-campaign and centered on lifting up parents’ needs.

When interviewees talked about the value PVO brought to the campaign, they pointed uniformly to PVO’s qualitative contributions: centering the needs of parents during the policy development process, engaging directly affected parents in the campaign, and connecting the campaign to the larger network of community organizations. Interviewees judged these contributions as critical to the campaign and all were unique to PVO—no other campaign participant could deliver on them. However, in a poetic twist, for PVO these contributions may have seemed less than noteworthy because they are the substance of PVO’s day-to-day work.
Another campaign accomplishment: Substantial capacity growth at Parent Voices Oakland

Involvement in the Measure A campaign catalyzed substantial capacity growth at PVO. As one interviewee described, “It was one of those catalyzing moments for their organization. In my experience with nonprofits, often you will see these moments where it’s like the perfect storm of their capacity and desire, political will, resources available, etc. And you kind of have to ride that wave and it catapults you into a different place in terms of influence and political power in your environment. I think that that was really this moment for Parent Voices.” PVO saw their capacity grow in several key dimensions:

**Increased PVO’s reputation and standing:** The Measure A campaign was a pivot point for PVO that raised the organization’s standing in Alameda County and beyond. “They’ve really taken themselves from being a very small grassroots organization to something that’s actually having a lot greater reach.” The campaign increased awareness of PVO county-wide and established them as the go-to organization on the impact of ECE policy on parents in Alameda County. “You had organizations who were going to be educating people about the ballot. And the first question they would ask is, what does Parent Voices say? Where’s Parent Voices positioned on this? They definitely became a focal point for people who think critically about whether or not to support certain issues.”

Their work on Measure A also set PVO up as a leader among their peers in the US. Since the campaign, other organizations have contacted PVO to get their advice on how to start and run a similar campaign. “I have been asked ‘how did you do that? My agency is looking to do something similar. Can you tell us what the process was? How were you able to get families to stand behind it and get the Board of supervisors and city officials to actually take meetings with you and listen to you?”

**Strengthened PVO’s relationships:** The campaign deepened PVO’s relationships with decision-makers, labor unions, and other community organizations in Alameda County. Observers described PVO’s relationships with other organizations as “honest,” “supportive,” and that they “are good for the future of what we’re trying to do together.” “That means that they can have even more effective collaboration in the future now that they know that they have each other’s back in a real way.”

**Increased PVO’s political know-how:** Through the campaign, PVO increased their political savvy and ability to conduct voter engagement as well as their knowledge of county budgeting, policy development, and electoral campaigning. PVO now has a “better understanding of how to navigate electoral process.” On a tactical level, the campaign showed PVO that “there are areas in the county that truly need more attention and need organizing to happen.”

A significant win for PVO was their increased ability to do electoral organizing, including managing phonebanks and canvasses, as well as “navigating the bureaucracy between c3 and c4 reporting and funding.”
Spurred PVO to formalize infrastructure: As a result of their experience on the campaign, PVO made substantial changes in the day-to-day operations of the organization. “We really got our stuff together and we’ve been much more organized internally ever since. It almost completely changed the culture of the organization in that we have staff meetings that people take extremely seriously, we do supervision, we create work plans, we make goals. We just got a lot more serious about our work.”

Developed PVO staff’s leadership abilities: Rising to the challenges of the campaign, and succeeding, gave PVO staff and volunteers an increased feeling of their own power and the power of their organization. “This is the first time we've ever had a campaign headquarters. We've never worked this closely on a ballot measure. I mean we were literally at the table. We were there with Clifford Moss and SEIU and those other folks and we had not done that in the past.”

The campaign allowed PVO staff, and Doutherd in particular, to step into newfound political power. “I don’t think this campaign was the thing that magically made Clarissa a new political being all of a sudden. I think she was already there. In many ways. I think that this campaign just kind of helped push her beyond where she already was.” As one PVO staff person reflected, “I got to watch what true leadership development looks like. These circumstances were challenging, but it sharpened all of us and made us work together. It was a huge test of our own commitment to this work, and to each other and we survived it. Not only did we survive this, we learned we could do it and I’ve asked multiple times in multiple ways ‘are you sure you want to do this again?’ to our active leaders and the answer is always ‘yes.’”
5. Community Change’s Contributions

Community Change is a national organization that partners with and supports community organizations throughout the country to “build the power and capacity of low-income people, especially low-income people of color, to change their communities and public policies for the better.” As a longtime partner to PVO, Community Change supported PVO throughout the policy development process and the campaign and contributed to the Measure A campaign in five distinct ways. Most important to PVO were funding and the direct technical and strategic support provided by Community Change organizer Cesar Hernandez. Community Change’s other contributions to the campaign included facilitating communication and relationship building within the campaign and connecting PVO to external resources.

Funding PVO and the Measure A campaign

Community Change “lent support to sustain the campaign” by providing funding to PVO directly and to the campaign via the East Bay Community Foundation. Community Change’s direct grant to PVO allowed PVO to build out their infrastructure for the campaign, in particular hiring a lawyer to ensure their compliance with campaign requirements. PVO also hired a full-time organizer during the campaign as well as paying the parent leaders who managed the phonebanks and canvasses. Said PVO, “What was helpful was providing the perfect amount of funding. We could tell [Community Change] knew what they were doing.” Community Change Action, the 501(c)4 sister organization to Community Change, also made a contribution to the Measure A campaign via the East Bay Community Foundation, which helped cover costs for Get Out The Vote, wages, and other needs for the final campaign push.

Providing hands-on, on-the-ground support to PVO

Community Change organizer Cesar Hernandez was a “coach” and “mentor” to PVO and his role ran the gamut from strategic guidance to community engagement, volunteer management to messaging and translation work, and even helping clean and pack up after canvassing and phonebanking shifts. Hernandez was in near-daily communication with PVO, other community and labor partners, and the campaign consultants. Said PVO, “Cesar was an organizers’ organizer. He helped us understand what we could push for, someone to bounce things off of. Helping us try to think through our organizing model and how we could show up in this space.”

Between February and June 2018, Hernandez made eight visits to Alameda County. This on-the-ground support was critical for PVO. “Cesar helped when things were falling apart in field offices with some of leaders. It’s such an intense process. Everyone was operating at a 15. To have someone fly down and come help was great. He was very hands on but respectful.” On site, Hernandez augmented PVO staff during phonebanks and participated in PVO’s canvases. He helped PVO manage interpersonal dynamics among volunteers and, as a native Spanish speaker, translated for PVO’s monolingual Spanish volunteers. He actively engaged in the Get Out the Vote efforts in the final days of the campaign.
PVO appreciated Hernandez’s combination of deep experience and respectful distance, “There were things Cesar was saying throughout that I only now understand. [He] gave us a lot of space to figure it out and that was really beneficial to us. The second time around, we’ll lean more on [Community Change’s] technical assistance. Now we know what to ask for.”

**Facilitating inter-campaign communication and relationship building**

Community Change facilitated relationships and communication within the campaign and also connected PVO, and the campaign generally, to resources and organizations outside of the immediate campaign orbit. “We don’t have a movement infrastructure to support PVO; this is why Community Change was helpful.” Community Change helped build the “connective tissue” between PVO and other organizations and supported PVO in “navigating relationships.”

During the busiest days of the campaign, Hernandez helped PVO maintain communication and connection with other campaign partners. Early on, PVO reported feeling somewhat removed from other campaign partners as PVO occupied a “satellite” office that was geographically removed from the campaign headquarters in Oakland. Hernandez acted as a conduit of updates and information between PVO, the campaign consultants, and SEIU. The close relationship between Hernandez and PVO allowed for Hernandez “to have PVO’s back” in these conversations and helped facilitate coordination between PVO and other groups. When one particularly contentious issue arose in the final days of the campaign, Hernandez stepped in to “have the conversation with the partners about why we needed to be more mindful of Parent Voices and Oakland Rising and ACCE’s position.” Regarding that same issue, one interviewee credited Hernandez with being the person to first bring the issue to their attention, which allowed the interviewee to move quickly and effectively to support the position of the community organizations.

**Providing strategy, policy, and communications support to PVO**

Throughout the campaign, Hernandez and other Community Change staff provided strategy support to PVO. Hernandez worked with Doutherd to strategize on PVO’s short-term campaign plans, including discussions about how to delegate work to staff and volunteers and to help Doutherd be realistic about the scope of her commitments. Hernandez was a thought partner, strategizing with PVO on longer-term organization strategy including how PVO could embrace and leverage its newfound growth after the conclusion of the campaign. Another Community Change organizer, Ross Fitzgerald, also provided strategic support to Doutherd, advising her on how PVO can sustain its position and maintain strong community voice during the policy implementation phase. During the campaign, Wendoly Marte, Community Change Senior Field Campaign Manager, was also available to help PVO. Toward the end of the campaign in particular, Marte and Doutherd communicated through calls and texts to troubleshoot tactical problems PVO was experiencing in the field.

In addition to strategy support, Community Change also provided assistance for policy development and some light messaging and media support.
• **Policy Development.** Community Change Director Chirag Mehta supported the development of the ECE policy, including helping PVO develop and propose language related to community governance and oversight. Mehta also reviewed policy language and had conversations with county staff to discuss policy nuances and provide feedback on draft language.

• **Messaging and Media.** At the request of the campaign consultants and PVO, Hernandez reviewed and provided input on overall campaign messaging, call scripts, communications plans, and some specific media pieces such as a radio spot. His review helped ensure their resonance with PVO’s audience.

### Connecting PVO to other external resources

In addition to facilitating inter-campaign connections, Community Change brought other resources and connections to the campaign and PVO. These connections helped expand the reach and capacity of the campaign and PVO. Some other examples of Community Change connecting PVO to external resources include:

• Community Change coordinated nationwide conference calls with PVO and other organizations working on economic justice and childcare issues. These conference calls gave PVO the opportunity to engage in conversations where they could “share knowledge, learn about strategies” and reflect on ways to integrate new ideas into their work. In May 2018, Community Change featured PVO during call with 15 childcare organizations from across the US, which resulted in “people flying in from other states to come and help us on the campaign.”

• Community Change gave PVO and Doutherd the opportunity to share their work with potential funders and collaborators, including inviting Doutherd to speak on behalf of PVO at a donor party in Oakland.

• Community Change communicated with national organizations like SEIU International and the Center for Popular Democracy to strategically coordinate their support to the campaign partners.

• Community Change advocated for the Measure A campaign with influential local groups, such as Genesis, a faith-based group with connections to key churches in Oakland and Pleasanton, to secure their endorsements for the measure.

### Perceptions of Community Change

Select interviewees at campaign partners who were close to PVO, including SEIU and the campaign consultants, were aware of Community Change, had met Hernandez, and understood his role. These partners considered Hernandez an asset to PVO, “I loved working with Cesar. I think he’s awesome. He was so helpful to Parent Voices as a communication strategist, as a coach, as a troubleshooter from my perspective from the outside. I think he was just great. He tried to make personal connections he had in the Bay Area to help the campaign and [brought] constructive criticism and just general positivity to the office and that was helpful.” However, although Community Change and Hernandez’s contributions
were known to a few partners, most interviewees were unable to speak to the specific contributions Community Change made to PVO and the campaign.

**Suggestions for additional forms of support from Community Change**

Looking to re-run Measure A in 2020, PVO showed a clear understanding of the support they will need: legal services for policymaking and campaign compliance, guidance in building relationships with other community and labor organizations, assistance with communications and messaging, and technical support to start up a new c4 organization.
6. Success Factors

A primary objective of this case study is to identify the success factors in the Measure A campaign that Community Change and others may aim to replicate. In doing so, we identified factors that supported the creation of Measure A and its inclusion on the ballot and factors that resulted in the campaign securing a majority of votes.

As in the previous case studies, we used a Context and Control framework to organize the causal factors that facilitated the campaign’s achievements. This framework differentiates between two types of success factors: contextual factors that are rooted in place and immutable in the short-term and those controllable factors that may be subject to influence by Community Change and its partners.

**Contextual factors**

Some success factors may be difficult, if not impossible, to intentionally replicate. These include the influence of national movements or those factors that are specific to the history, culture, or geography of place. Four contextual factors influenced the achievements of the Measure A campaign.

A. Prior, discrete local events that sparked interest in an ECE measure.

Three Bay Area policies catalyzed support for a new way to fund ECE and raise wages for childcare workers in Alameda County.

**Minimum wage increase in Oakland:** In November 2014, voters in Oakland passed Measure FF, the Minimum Wage Increase Initiative, which increased the minimum wage in the city to $12.25 per hour beginning in March 2015. The wage increase, however, had negative unintended consequences for the childcare industry. Because the childcare industry works with narrow profit margins, the wage increase left childcare businesses vulnerable to layoffs, tuition increases, and/or closures. These unintended impacts increased the urgency for new revenue sources that could support childcare providers and workers: “When the minimum wage went up in Oakland, [childcare] providers were devastated and didn’t know what to do...It was from some of the meetings that we did with [childcare] workers that the idea of revenue sources came up.”

**San Francisco’s Children and Youth Fund:** In 1991, San Francisco voters passed an amendment to the city charter, creating a dedicated Children’s Fund that would set aside four percent of local property tax revenues for services for children, youth, and their families. San Francisco was the first city in the country to have guaranteed funding for children in the city budget, and the Fund was renewed in 2000 and again in 2014. According to interviewees, the Fund was an important model for Measure A and influenced the cost calculations and accountability planning.

**Declining revenues from First 5:** First 5 in Alameda County was created by the passage of Proposition 10 in 1998. The proposition added 50 cents to the sale of each pack of cigarettes to help fund childcare and early education for children from birth through age five. However, since 2000, First 5 has seen declining
revenues as tobacco tax funding has decreased. Alameda County officials, recognizing that ECE would need a new revenue source, had been looking for opportunities to propose a stable, long-term funding source.

**B. Increasing economic inequality and costs-of-living**

In the years leading up to the Measure A campaign, increasing economic inequality and costs-of-living in Alameda County sharpened the need for subsidized childcare. “We hear all the time about how the cost of housing is pushing families out. But there’s this kind of other underbelly and the hidden costs that families are going bankrupt, trying to pay for childcare or are locked out of the workforce, and then not able to make rent because they don’t have childcare. So I think that was a big impetus for putting it on the ballot now.” ECE had long been seen by county officials and residents as a “long-term part of the puzzle to deal with poverty.” As such, as inequalities have grown, county officials and organizations have felt increased urgency to address access to ECE.

**C. Progressive electorate**

The progressive political leaning of voters in Alameda County helped bring Measure A to the ballot. “There’s a progressive history in the East Bay that made it much more receptive to this than other places might be.” In addition to their progressive leanings, Alameda County voters are noted as being “very generous when it comes to meeting the needs of children...folks in Alameda County are pretty progressive about how we are supporting low income and working families.” As such, voters were predisposed to support ECE in Alameda County more so than other places might have been.

Voters in Alameda County also share a commitment to addressing community issues via ballot initiatives. As one interviewee pointed out, “It’s pretty much pro forma now that in each election cycle there is some sort of ballot initiative... They had done something on transit. They had done something on healthcare. They had done something on housing. So it was like, okay, what’s next?”

**D. Deep technical expertise and history of work on ECE issues in Alameda County**

For over 20 years, childcare specialists in Alameda County worked to document the population’s need and discuss solutions for addressing gaps in ECE. By the time the language for Measure A was written, the county had deep technical expertise and a history of work in this issue that facilitated the creation of a strong policy for ECE. Angie Garling, Alameda County ECE Program Administrator, was praised by several interviewees for her leadership in the creation of the Measure A language. She provided critical research and analysis about solutions for ECE and she had a “superb staff of people working together in the county that had credibility in the community and could command respect by a lot of people.”

**Controllable factors**

Some success factors may be replicable, given sufficient funding, time, and willingness on the part of partners in the field. Six potentially controllable factors were identified in this case study which had a positive impact on the campaign’s achievements.
A. Breadth and commitment of campaign partners

A key factor in the success of the Measure A campaign was the “tremendous,” “large,” strong, and diverse group of organizations and individuals working in collaboration on the measure. Campaign partners included a diverse mix of labor organizations, community organizations, the county Board of Supervisors, policy experts, political consultants, and faith-based groups. Campaign partners came from “different fields, different communities” working “across organizational lines” to pass the Measure. To some interviewees, this diversity was a critical “ingredient” in the campaign’s successes, including its ability to gain support from nearly two out of three county voters.

Campaign partners shared a deep commitment to passing the Measure. “There was such a passion and desire from all parties to put this over the top and to really give it the very best try we could.” Interviewees felt that this “shared purpose” caused the organizations to put the cause first, facilitating relationships and easing the resolution of differences.

B. Advocacy from key members of the County Board of Supervisors

Early in its development, Measure A had support from two members of the Board of Supervisors. Board Supervisors Chan and Miley had long been passionate about ECE, and early on, put their influence, staff, and expertise to work in support of the measure. Their advocacy with the other Supervisors and their understanding of how to craft policy was critical to getting Measure A on the ballot. By the time the Board of Supervisors voted on the ballot language in early 2018, the Supervisors approved it with a unanimous vote.

Supervisor Chan’s leadership was particularly valuable due to her expertise and ten-year history in ECE work in the county and state. Supervisor Chan put her “juice and staff and expertise and influence” behind Measure A. “She brought Miley along with her on the journey...she was the driving force...having an elected who’s specifically interested in putting their capital behind it can give you a vehicle to move something.” Although other constituencies played important roles in the Measure A campaign, it “wouldn’t have been possible without the Board of Supervisors approving it and believing that we could get voters and residents on board and to believe in this and to vote ‘Yes.’”

C. Strong support of labor organizations

SEIU is a “politically and financially powerful” labor union in Alameda County that provided consistent, early, and critical support to the ballot initiative. “SEIU is the strong voice at the [Alameda] Central Labor Council [(CLC)]. So if you get SEIU, you’ve got a good shot of getting CLC support for campaigns.” SEIU brought important resources and connections to the creation of the ballot initiative and lent their considerable political power to help gain the support of the Board of Supervisors. “In our community, labor has to be firmly behind what you’re doing. They have to be at the table and be invested and SEIU was fully invested.”

SEIU brought significant resources to bear on the Measure A campaign. Approximately a year and a half before the campaign, SEIU provided funding for the initial polling that demonstrated ECE’s viability with
voters and also contributed about a quarter of the campaign’s total funding. In addition to financial resources, SEIU brought a depth of campaign experience in “how to go about putting something like this together.” They also had a large volunteer base to fortify the phonebanking and canvassing efforts. SEIU held phonebanks staffed by experienced phonebankers and used SEIU’s call center in New York to make phone calls to voters. One interviewee reported that “at least half of all the GOTV shifts” were done by SEIU in the final four days of the campaign.

D. Engagement of directly affected people in policy advocacy and creation
The creation of Measure A was “deeply rooted” in the engagement of directly affected communities. “It helped to ground the campaign in the real impacts on families, particularly low-income families, what these children and families would receive if the measure passed.”

PVO’s work “training,” “organizing,” and “motivating” a “directly impacted base of residents” was critical because the stories and experiences of impacted communities were influential in gaining the support of the Board of Supervisors and influencing and shaping the language of Measure A.

Interviewees noted that the “sheer level” of community engagement was not only a major success factor but was in itself a major accomplishment of the campaign. “I've worked on a lot of different issues. I've worked for different candidates. I've been in different parts of the process of generating measures and then getting them passed and I've just never seen the level of like intentionality around community engagement.”

E. Expertise, technical brilliance, and persistence of Clarissa Doutherd
“Her energy and her spirit combined with her knowledge is just a force to be reckoned with.” County officials, campaign partners, funders, and other community organizations recognized Clarissa Doutherd, Executive Director of PVO, as a “powerful,” “dynamic,” and “gutsy” leader and advocate for Measure A. During policy creation and negotiations, Doutherd brought a “nuanced” and “insightful” understanding about childcare issues in the county and “deep, deep knowledge of the early education system, how it works, who it serves, who it fails, and how certain policy decisions produce both intended and unintended consequences.” She brought a perspective that was “fully rooted in community and in the experiences of families and not just there to make expedient policy decisions.” Doutherd was a strong advocate for children from low-income families and persistent in her advocacy for an ECE policy that would authentically support the most directly impacted children and families. Campaign partners and county officials alike credited Doutherd with centering the needs of parents and children from low-income families and securing significant funding to support them in the Measure A policy.

F. Proactive funding community and substantial funding support
The innovative funding model pioneered by EBCF was a major achievement of the Measure A campaign, and one of the key factors in facilitating the campaign’s success. Long before the Measure A campaign kicked off, there were “a couple of key people in philanthropy” who were interested in the childcare issue and “were able to galvanize folks and start fundraising.” Some funders in the Bay Area held a long commitment to supporting childcare issues in the county. They provided proactive support to the
campaign, recruiting and organizing other funders and setting up the fund at EBCF. SEIU also provided some early financial backing for the campaign, funding a poll in 2017 to explore the viability of the measure and providing about one-fourth of the funding to support the Measure A campaign.

All told, funding support to the Measure A campaign amounted to approximately $1.2 million. This funding allowed the campaign to hire the political consultants, do polling, and support the campaign work of community organizations like ACCE and PVO. “It wasn’t a $50,000 campaign, it was a million-dollar campaign, and we were able to have political consultants on early and do some pretty significant polling which helped give us feedback along the way.” A good portion of the funding also went to support community organizations, like PVO, to help them set up their own campaign operations. As one interviewee noted, without the funding in place the campaign “wouldn’t have had Parent Voices. They would have not been able to set up shop themselves and do phone calls.”
7. Why Didn’t Measure A Pass?

Because the campaign lost by such a small margin, interviewees felt almost any small difference could have changed the outcome. Interviewees provided numerous possible explanations for the loss of Measure A. The following discussion aggregates and synthesizes those explanations voiced by interviewees in order of frequency of mentions.

**Strategic choices about voter targeting**

Most interviewees pointed to voter targeting as one strategic choice that, in hindsight, they believed could have earned them the 1,499 additional votes needed to reach 66.7 percent.

Interviewees diverged on their opinions about how the campaign could have targeted voters differently to secure more votes. As expected, the campaign did well in North County, which includes the progressive cities of Berkely, Emeryville, and Oakland. However, some interviewees felt the campaign should have put more time into the Central and South parts of the county, including Hayward and the Tri-Valley. “We never really expected the Measure to do super well in East County, in Pleasanton, Dublin, Livermore. We always expected it to do really well in North County, Oakland, Berkeley, Albany, Piedmont, Emeryville. I think where we really missed an opportunity was in South County and places like Fremont and Hayward and Unincorporated County San Leandro, San Lorenzo area.” “We didn’t do very well in Central County and that’s an area where we know we have to do well to win two-thirds ballot measures.” While well over two-thirds of North County voters voted in favor of the Measure, just slightly less than two-thirds of voters in Central and South County voted in favor. Some campaign partners noted that just a couple more percentage points in Central and South County that that would have put them over the top.

Other campaign partners believed the campaign needed to do more to engage certain “subclimates” of voters, including older Democratic voters who don’t need childcare, lower income households in North County, or early voters. “We lost a lot of older Democratic homeowners in San Leandro and Hayward. And we obviously misunderstood what was going on as they were making decisions and that could have been enough to put us over the top.” “We've got to pay more attention to these sub-climates and we've got to really look at what we would call ‘less likely to vote’ households and say, ‘How could we get some more of the less likely voters to show up and vote on our measure?’”
Challenges addressing race in the policy making process and campaign

Measure A sought to address problems that disproportionately affect people of color, who are more likely than white people to be unable to afford childcare without subsidies, have difficulty finding affordable and high-quality childcare, and are also more likely to be childcare workers. This was well understood by all those involved in drafting the Measure A policy.

In terms of the role of race in the policy-making process, recollections differ. A county childcare specialist recalled, “Race and gender were through lines in our conversation throughout the year that we designed the policy.” For an African American community leader, discussions of race during this period were difficult. Conversations about race engendered “nervousness” among the Steering Committee. There was an “inability to talk about race and gender,” and times when members seemed oblivious to the systemic causes of the childcare crisis. There was an “inability to talk about families in poverty and homelessness and harm by the system. It’s easier to talk about making individuals better. There is an assumption that people put themselves there—we help them so we don’t have another generation of people like them. People were being racist but were scared of being called racist and I wasn’t scared to call them racist.”
Interviewees agreed that the racial aspects of the county’s childcare crisis were not at the forefront of the Measure A campaign. The campaign’s messaging did not speak to the way Measure A would address the racial inequities in access to childcare, focusing instead on the universal benefits of early childhood education. According to interviewees, early polling data suggested arguments based on brain science—the importance of early education for a person’s long-term success—had the broadest appeal among likely voters. The result was an undifferentiated outward-facing campaign message centered on science and facts that, some interviewees hypothesized, did not match the lived experience of the county’s people of color and, in particular, African American women.

In the parts of the county where the need is greatest, the brain science message may have seemed peripheral to more pressing day-to-day concerns. In these neighborhoods, describing the specific benefits of Measure A may have resonated more strongly. “I think the campaign could have been more inclusive of a specific racial justice lens in how it talked about the work. When you’re in parts of the county, particularly South Alameda, where we have some of the highest poverty rates, people have some of the greatest need in terms of early childhood and education. What people were hearing in conversations on the doors, when you’re sticking with a narrative about brain development, it was like, ‘We are part of the county too. We always pay into stuff but we never get our fair share back.’ The campaign was not able to pivot and create a more specific message for the neighborhood that clearly has significant need.”

Leaders voiced their concerns and those they were hearing from voters at multiple points during the campaign, in particular with regard to the phone and door scripts but did not feel heard. “I think there were potentially moments when the community was trying to feed back into the campaign around messaging and what’s working in certain areas and what we could do instead. And I don’t think that it was taken seriously.”

Lacking an integrated racial analysis with which to guide their strategy, messaging, and voter engagement plans, the campaign emphasized income inequality when needing to generalize about a demographic characteristic and always depicted parents and children of multiple races in campaign imagery. A campaign staff member’s answer to a question about the role of race in their work illustrates this race-blind perspective, “I don't really remember [race] being discussed in meetings in particular, I think I don't even know the racial breakdown of our targeted audience, the people on the waiting list for childcare and early education. I don't know the breakdown of how many are people of color. Perhaps it was the majority, but that's not what we were working towards. [For us it] was more about income inequality.”

For some interviewees, the lack of attention to race in the campaign was a miss. “I think it is equally and in fact potentially more powerful to name black women because the majority of community leadership I saw was African American women. We don’t often talk about how African American families are the most disproportionately affected by the childcare crisis.”
Challenges with campaign messaging

Many interviewees said adjustments to the campaign’s communications had potential to change the outcome of the vote, from small tweaks to a wholesale overhaul of key messages.

In addition to the messaging issues described above, perhaps the broadest change interviewees mentioned was the suggestion to refrain from calling childcare a “crisis.” The word featured prominently in nearly all campaign materials, from phone scripts to door hangers. Some interviewees said voters heard exaggeration in the term, accustomed as they were to hearing about and personally experiencing the county’s other crises—affordable housing, homelessness, cost of living, or transportation.

The complexity and breadth of Measure A made it an excellent piece of policy, but a messaging “challenge.” There was no single big goal to use as the rallying cry, for example, “universal pre-K.” Explained one interviewee, “We decided to make smaller dents in many things. We were moving many levers on many axes, and that made it murky for voters. There were questions about whether it was childcare or preschool, were the desired outcomes for children vs. families vs. teachers. Even my wonky friends didn’t fully understand it, ‘What is it doing for who? How will we know that it was successful?’ A good piece of policy is nuanced, but it’s the opposite when it comes to campaigns. It makes it harder to get people on board and to vote for something.”

Interviewees made numerous other suggestions regarding changes to campaign messaging, including:

- Differentiating messages based on the characteristics of the community
- Listing the specific benefits a community would receive (for example, the additional number of subsidized childcare spots)
- Directly addressing how county leaders would be held accountable for spending the Measure A revenue as intended
- Reducing the number of “asks” in the phone and door scripts
- Adjusting the framing and use of language in phone and door scripts to make them more relatable for voters.

Technical and language barriers slowed the pace of voter identification

Some interviewees suggested that greater support for the labor and community organizations doing the majority of the phonebanking could have gotten the Measure the additional 1,000-odd votes needed to pass. The phonebank software was universally reported to be “glitchy,” presenting problems for even the most experienced phonebankers and often leaving volunteers sitting idle. One interviewee recalled an evening when a shift of 10 volunteers were unable to make any calls at all. The campaign consultants viewed these technical difficulties as par for the course, noting that on campaigns, the “technology is never perfect” and describing how they sent staff to support organizations to “make sure that any field office with technical difficulties has paper lists and pre-paid cell phones.”
The fact that the campaign was slow to provide Spanish translations of phonebank scripts and lists of Spanish-speaking voters was also a drag on voter ID counts that interviewees agreed should be addressed in future campaigns by, for example, “preparing a team that can translate quickly.”

**Short campaign timeline**

Organizers are always working against the clock, and this was especially true on the Measure A campaign. There were a scant 14 weeks from the day the Board of Supervisors put the Measure on the ballot to Election Day and 10 weeks from the campaign kick-off event.

**Everything but the kitchen sink**

Interviewees mentioned a grab bag of other hypotheses as to why Measure A did not pass:

- A small mistake in the legal language of the Measure led a county newspaper to withhold its endorsement.
- The choice to run the Measure in the June rather than November election, resulting in the Measure running when there was lower overall turnout and lower turnout among supporters.
- The need for substantially more effort towards organizing childcare center managers and owners.
- Lack of clarity in direction to county employees as to how they could engage with the campaign on their personal time.
- Framing of service as “childcare” rather than “preschool” deterred some voters, who may have been more likely to support the latter because it “sounds like an investment.”
8. Challenges for Community Organizations Engaging in Electoral Work

Engaging in deep electoral work, as PVO did on the Measure A campaign, helps organizations build political muscle that cannot be strengthened in other ways. Success grows leaders’ confidence, gives everyone in the organization a sense of power and agency in their community, and raises the organization’s profile among their peers and with decision-makers.

While phonebanking and canvassing are the nuts and bolts of electoral organizing, few of PVO’s staff or volunteers had worked on an electoral campaign prior to Measure A. Their experience lifts up issues other community organizations may encounter when engaging in deep electoral work for the first time, the capacities they need to thrive, and the support organizations like Community Change can provide to position them for success.

Balancing authentic community engagement and the drive to meet quantitative targets

The Measure A campaign revealed a common, recurring dynamic between the traditional political campaigns and community organizations doing electoral work. Traditional political campaigns and consultants are often subject to unrelenting timelines, compelling them to place high value on quantitative outputs and to direct their limited resources to targeting likely or high propensity voters. They focus narrowly on turning out the number of voters required to win the election. “They need to get to Election Day and get over the top.” This traditional approach to voter targeting tends to leave out more inconsistent or newer voters who are often young, immigrants, people of color, or lower income.

In contrast, during the Measure A campaign, community organizations sought to not only turn out voters but to also engage historically underrepresented voters in elections, raise awareness of issues, build their base, and develop local volunteers and leaders who will continue to support their organizations and issues after the campaign ends. “We are organizing these people the day before the election and the day after the election, the day after that. We’re in this for the long haul with these people.”

Community organizations, like PVO, had to balance the campaign’s need for quantitative output—hitting daily and weekly targets for voter identification—with their desire to operate the phonebanks and canvasses in a way that was consistent with the values and mission of their organization. The Measure A campaign consultants reflected that, because of the strong values and beliefs of the community organizations involved in Measure A, they saw this tension between the traditional campaign approach and the community-centered approach “more than in other places.”

Pursuing these dual goals with limited time and resources was a continuous challenge for PVO. According to one PVO staff member, the key question was: “How do we maximize our time and make accommodations, so people have things they need?” For PVO the volunteers’ experience was
paramount. Most volunteers were parents who had been through PVO’s leadership training and with whom the organization expected to have a relationship long after the Measure A campaign concluded. Every decision PVO made was guided by their assessment of how it would impact their parent volunteers. Explained a PVO staff member, “We have tried to run the most integrity-rooted, community-centered, patient, loving, phonebank possible. We've tried to foster an environment where people feel comfortable to say they need help or to ask questions.”

In finding a location for the phonebanks, however, PVO hit an unexpected “snag” because there were few locations that met all their needs: located in a neighborhood easy for volunteers to access with qualities conducive to parents. Explained a PVO staff member, “We wanted something that's community and family friendly. We wanted to share it with other organizations. It needed to be safe for babies and children.” Creating the kind of phonebank environment PVO desired required time—to find an appropriate space, educate volunteers, address questions, and allow for breaks and a social atmosphere. And this necessarily took away from the time available to complete calls.

**Gaining legitimacy, respect, and decision-making power in traditional electoral spaces**

The campaign was marked by tension between community organizations and the Measure A campaign consultant, Clifford Moss. Most interviewees touched on these tensions, which can be traced back to two key aspects of the campaign structure. From the very beginning of the campaign, Clifford Moss and community organizations differed sharply in their expectations about the role of community organizations. Further stoking tensions was the informal approach to decision-making on the campaign, in which the decision-making table was fluid, with few explicit processes or participants.

**The importance of a transparent and mutually-agreed upon campaign structure that centers community organizations**

The campaign structure put in place by Clifford Moss assigned community and labor a role and responsibility that differed from what those organizations experienced during the policy making process and what they expected for themselves during the campaign.

For nearly a year before the Measure A campaign began, PVO as well as other community and labor organizations were key members of the policy Steering Committee, leaders in the policy-making process. When the campaign began in the spring of 2018, the role of community and labor organizations shifted in the ecosystem, from being key members of the policy Steering Committee to a consultative role on the periphery of the campaign’s strategic decision-making team.

The Clifford Moss campaign organization chart names nine people as campaign leads—all elected officials, their staff, or Clifford Moss consultants; none represented community or labor (Figure 1).
In the campaign org chart, community and labor, faith organizations, campaign volunteers and paid callers are all part of the “Victorious Village.” As a campaign consultant explained, “We had a core group of people who came together. We called them our ‘Victorious Village’ and we would bring them together to engage, to be a sounding board, to assist.”

It is important to note that only some community or labor interviewees were familiar with this chart, none used the term “Victorious Village” to describe their role, and some had objected to this term from the beginning. For community organizations, their position in the “Victorious Village” seems to have become clear only as the campaign progressed and was not what they expected, “There was what we were told and what actually happened.” The campaign consultants too recognized how this shift in roles, while typical of the transition from pre-electoral to electoral work, would have been surprising for an organization like PVO, noting that “perhaps we did not define the roles as clearly or front load decisions.”

The contrast in perspectives between the campaign consultants and community organizations becomes even sharper with regard to their assessment of how successful the campaign was in incorporating community voice. For Clifford Moss, the Measure A campaign was, while not without its tensions, “one
of the most collaborative, collective campaigns that I’ve ever seen... There was, from the get-go, a very early collaborative foundation for this whole effort.” The many community, labor, and faith organizations would “plug in throughout the campaign at various times...not [on] the sidelines to just be an idea generator [but] as part of the real workforce [of] collaborators.”

For PVO, however, their level of engagement in campaign decision-making was not sufficient. The consultative role in which they found themselves felt peripheral and even, at times, devalued by campaign leaders. “The reality of what this looked like was us having weekly conversations with the consultant and their hired staff telling us what was going on, saying ‘we’re the experts, we’ve done this a bunch of times, if you follow this formula, you do not lose.’ Even though there was cognitive dissonance with our experience, they were throwing out all that we heard from voters. The ability to make decisions about technology, when to pivot, decision-making processes, and how to support organizations in the field, there wasn’t a lot of space for us to be involved in those processes.”

Said another, “We would raise questions. It would take a while to get answers. We would not ever know necessarily if all of our input had been taken on the actual campaign. It was a real transition from the county planning process which had its flaws, but I thought was much more inclusive than the last three months of the campaign was.”

Campaign consultants emphasized that the 88-day timeline limited their ability to execute a campaign in which all campaign partners could be involved in a majority of campaign decisions. The campaign consultants were aware of the frustrations and wished “there were the conditions where we could have stopped to participate in an even more collaborative campaign. We’re very familiar with a much more focused campaign and being accountable to a very small circle, not a lot of collaboration. That’s the model that has prevailed in two-thirds elections. You can’t have multiple decision-makers because you’re in the throes of execution of a campaign plan. We tried to collaborate much more than we have done on other campaigns. But I think because of the belief systems and paradigms of partners and their members, we could not meet their expectations for how they wanted to see that process work.”

Other interviewees disagreed strongly that a short campaign timeline prohibits inclusive decision-making. “That 88-day window did not change. We were working on this for a long time. It speaks to a lack of planning to set up a structure that is inclusive of community input in a robust and authentic way.”

The consequences of an informal decision-making table

The Measure A campaign had no formal decision-making table, with “minor decisions to major decisions being made at every step of the way.” Decisions were made during the weekly strategy calls, weekly field calls, and also by an “executive team” of fewer than 10 people “applying very collaborative principles.” The executive team was not listed on the campaign org chart and was “informal” and open to anyone who wanted to participate, but included most consistently the campaign’s assistant treasurer and campaign manager, who talked “multiple times a day.”
Although the campaign communicated regularly with partners (through field calls on Mondays and strategy calls with organizational leaders on Thursdays) and the executive team “wasn’t closed, anyone could join at any time,” community leaders described feeling shut out of campaign decision-making. “It became apparent that [the consultants] saw [the county] as their client. And so it was very frustrating. It didn’t motivate or inspire any of us because we’re like, wait, we are more than just phone callers.” Nor did community leaders feel heard when it came to contributing input to strategic decisions, “I had the experience of feeling excluded. I felt like we had real experience and expertise and knowledge that would have potentially been useful in making decisions that would have gotten us over the top.”

Without a fixed decision-making table, one can imagine that decisions were made by those closest at hand, in consultation with those holding the most influence. Community leaders were neither. Based out of offices remote from the campaign headquarters, they were geographically removed. They were not financial contributors to the campaign nor positioned explicitly as members of the leadership in the campaign org chart.

**Learning about electoral organizing while on the job**

The high-pressure, time-constrained environment in which the electoral work needed to be completed was challenging for PVO. With no time to prepare in advance, PVO leaders learned on the job and executed on multiple fronts simultaneously: finding a leased space for the phonebank, obtaining the right computer and phone equipment for volunteers and teaching them how to use it, navigating and troubleshooting the phonebank software, training volunteers in the reasons for and procedures of voter identification, and record-keeping and reporting.

In the first few weeks of the campaign, a PVO staff member described her concern, “We are meeting our numbers in terms of volunteers. I have no concerns about the quality or capabilities of the volunteers. My big uncertainty is whether we will be able to support our parent leaders sufficiently so that these leaders can get the performance out of the phonebankers. We need to provide the right container in which the work can be done efficiently.”

A PVO staff member recalled her frustration with the lack of advance training on the phonebank software, “We got exposed to [the software we would be using] the same day as the volunteers because the training we went to was on [a different software]. It was like April Fools’, literally this isn’t the system we’re using. It was another thing that we pushed for—advanced access to the Chromebooks and the [phonebank software] so that PVO staff could practice it, so we could better explain it to our volunteers. But that did not happen.”

Campaign consultants or other organizations more experienced in campaign work may not recognize or plan for the extra support required by those engaging in electoral work for the first time. On the Measure A campaign, some campaign staff experienced the higher level of support needed by PVO as an unexpected burden, “They were struggling with tech. We had to hold their hand a whole lot.”
Training and providing real-time support to volunteers on electoral processes, computer technology, or translation services

Most (if not all) PVO volunteers had no previous experience with campaign work and needed to learn both the purpose of the various tasks and how to conduct them. Some volunteers had low levels of digital literacy. Many volunteers were monolingual Spanish speakers.

PVO volunteers needed training in the fundamentals of phonebanking. Having never participated in a campaign in this way, they lacked a big-picture understanding of why they were making calls and how the information they were collecting would be used. This became apparent when, in the early weeks of the campaign, PVO staff realized some volunteers were inflating the number of “yes IDs” they reported. For the volunteers, the work of making the IDs was dissociated from the larger campaign mission and instead became a competition, the field on which long-time personal rivalries played out, heightened by the chance to win retail gift cards.

Many PVO volunteers lacked basic digital literacy. A PVO staff member described the challenge this presented: “If folks aren’t familiar with how to use a computer or laptop, then there’s only so much I can do. As an agency, we don’t offer any kind of computer class or anything like that, although we had recently been talking about it because we didn’t realize the number of people who don’t have access or ongoing exposure to a computer. For them, even just manipulating the mouse is difficult. We had to get flip phones for the senior volunteers because a smartphone, it just sends them into a frenzy. It will be on the selfie screen when it should be on the call screen. They’ll be opening up Yahoo or Youtube when they’re trying to redial a number.”

With the combined challenges of volunteers who were new to phonebanking, unskilled in computer use, and non-English speakers, PVO staff at times felt overwhelmed, “People are struggling and they’re not saying to me that they need help or that they’re struggling. It takes for me to notice while I’m scanning, going through emails, responding to emails, trying to do tech reports, and trying to listen for valid phone conversations, to see that there is someone who is sitting idle too long.”

For PVO, the high level of support required by volunteers was also unexpected and PVO would have benefited from having additional staff on hand during the phonebanks. PVO phonebank manager Rachel Harralson, in reflecting on her experience, commented, “There are some things that I would ask for before I said yes. I would advocate first and foremost to have a second person. I needed a wing woman or a wing man. I would not do this again by myself.”

Expending significant staff and financial resources

Electoral work requires an enormous investment of resources for smaller community organizations. Campaigns often monopolize staff and deplete financial and emotional reserves. PVO experienced aspects of this drain. Staff spent about 60 percent of their time on the campaign, with the exception of Harralson, who managed the phonebanks and worked on the campaign full-time. Said Doutherd, “We
were still running other programming during the campaign which also made this difficult. I still had to
fundraise and run the organization. We didn’t anticipate doing as much field as we did. During the next
round we’d plan this all out differently.”

Within the context of the campaign itself, PVO’s electoral work subsumed Doutherd to such an extent
that she found it difficult to stay involved in the strategic aspects of campaign, in particular policy
decision-making, and worried she was losing her seat at the table with the other leaders. As she
observed in the campaign’s early weeks, “Implementation has actually started and decisions are being
made now in the county, it’s a challenge to stay engaged and in leadership with that process while doing
the work of passing the initiative.”

Navigating new and burdensome legal and reporting requirements

PVO was overwhelmed by the complicated reporting requirements of campaign work. Community
Change’s support helped PVO hire a treasurer and contract with legal staff to support their reporting,
yet PVO still felt blindsided when they found out about reports they were supposed to have filed but
hadn’t. Said a PVO staff member of the reporting challenges in the early weeks of the campaign, “We
don’t have lawyers and other infrastructure that makes this easy.” One interviewee emphasized the
burden these requirements place on community organizations and the importance of support for these
functions, noting that even though their own organization is large, well-resourced, and has a staff
attorney, they still face difficult complying with reporting requirements.

What support do community organizations like PVO need to succeed in
electoral work?

Community organizations engaging in deep electoral work for the first time will require more and
different types of support than experienced campaigners. PVO’s experience suggests several ways to
support these organizations:

- Before the campaign, train organizational leaders on phonebank and canvass management and
  the relevant hardware and software.
- During the campaign, provide organizational leaders with frequent virtual or in-person
  mentoring from an experienced campaigner.
- Provide funding to augment staff, particularly for tasks in which the organization’s leaders are
  inexperienced.
- Help set expectations with campaign partners, other funders, or consultants regarding the
  higher level of support community organizations may require.
- Encourage campaign managers to set lower voter contact targets for organizations whose
  leadership or volunteers are new to electoral work or need support with technology or
  language.
➢ Support organizational leaders in training volunteers in an overview of campaign work and explain the rationale for various campaign activities.

➢ Provide technology training for community leaders and their members on electoral software and phonebank processes, as well as computer and smartphone fundamentals.

➢ Provide funding for or direct translation services for instructional and other campaign materials.

9. What’s Next for Measure A

The expansive early childhood policy that came to be known as Measure A has likely not seen its last campaign. Nearly all interviewees expect the policy to be back on the ballot in November 2020. Over the next year and a half, advocates plan to conduct additional polling to test messages and refine their campaign strategy, make minor adjustments to the policy to address issues raised in the 2018 campaign, and continue tracking demographic shifts in Alameda County and their potential impacts on support for the policy.

When looking to 2020 and a potential re-running of Measure A, PVO leaders expressed a preference for a different type of campaign, one in which community organizations are centered and decision-making is collaborative. One interviewee summed up the sentiment, “How we win is important. We have to let go of the idea that we can’t win by centering community.”
10. Acknowledgements

This case study is part of a multi-year grant from the JPB Foundation to Innovation Network, Inc. to provide evaluation support to Community Change and its Economic Justice Initiative. The authors are Dr. Marti Frank, Principal at Efficiency for Everyone; Katie Fox, Senior Associate at Innovation Network; Briana Rusian, Research Analyst at Innovation Network; and Johanna Morariu, Director at Innovation Network.

The authors would like to thank the interviewees for their time and thoughtful comments:

- Erin Armstrong, (previously) Measure A Field Director
- Nelsey Batista, (previously) Organizer, Parent Voices Oakland
- Seth Borgos, Director of Research and Program Development, Community Change
- Margaret Brodkin, Margaret Brodkin and Associates
- Dave Brown, Chief of Staff to Supervisor Wilma Chan, Alameda County
- Wilma Chan, County Supervisor, Alameda County
- Laura Crotty, Senior Advisor, CliffordMoss
- Clarissa Doutherd, Executive Director, Parent Voices Oakland
- Casey Farmer, (previously) Measure A Campaign Manager
- Carroll Fife, Executive Director, ACCE Oakland
- Amy Fitzgerald, Senior Program Officer, East Bay Community Foundation
- Alexa Frankenberg, Childcare Lead, SEIU International
- Mark Friedman, CEO, Thomas Joy Long Foundation
- Angie Garling, ECE Program Administrator, Alameda County
- Rachel Harralson, Outreach Coordinator, Parent Voices Oakland
- Cesar Hernandez, Senior Organizer, Community Change
- Sonya Mehta, (previously) Legislative Design Specialist, Alameda County
- Bonnie Moss, Principal, CliffordMoss
- Malia Ramler, Senior Program Administrator, First 5

In addition, we acknowledge the support of the broader evaluation team, including Margaret Post, Ph.D, and wish to also thank our collaborating partners at Community Change, Seth Borgos, Emily Fischer, and Cesar Hernandez.